Article Access: A French Paradox? Islam and Laïcité
First enshrined in law in 1905, laïcité is a “particular French version of secularism” (Tolan, 2017, p.41) that guarantees freedom of religion while separating the French State from religious influence. As France continues to evolve as a multicultural and diverse republic, laïcité is increasingly viewed as a point of contention, particularly evident in “debates over symbolic expression of Islam” (p.49).
Through his article, John Tolan seeks to explore the roots of the tension between laïcité and Islam by examining “how laïcité has emerged and evolved in French society and its relation to religion, in particular Islam” (2017, p.41). He argues that it is impossible to move toward a solution to this friction without understanding “all of its history and complexities” (2017, p.49).
Understanding the historical context of laïcité and Islam
Whilst laïcité was not enshrined in law until 1905, its origins trace back to the French Revolution in 1789. This is evident in the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, which affirmed that “no one may be disturbed for his opinions, even religious ones, provided that their manifestation does not trouble the public order established by law” (Tolan, 2017, p. 42).
This explicit reference to the separation between private freedom of religious expression and public religious involvement in the state, was, at the time, particularly aimed at protecting “citizens from the overbearing Church” (2017, p.42) and Catholic influence over the French government.
It is also important to recognize that laïcité developed in the context of the expansion of the French Empire, alongside the establishment of the French Republic. As such, laïcité and Islam first interacted within the framework of France’s colonial domination. This colonial dynamic provides important context for current discussions of Islam and laïcité in the modern era.
In Algeria, which was first invaded by France in 1830 (Murray-Miller, 2014), French colonial rule sought to “control and domesticate” (Tolan, 2017, p.43) Islam in order to limit its power. This effort was evident in the monitoring of Islamic pilgrimages to Mecca, which were perceived as a potential gateway to Arab nationalism and political Islam — both viewed as threats to French rule over Algeria. Similarly, in 1850, the French state built three madrasas (Islamic schools) as a means of “domestication.” The creation of state-run madrasas in Algeria allowed France to extend its influence into the religious sphere in addition to the economic, social, and political domains.
At the same time, however, French rule tried to strike a balance that allowed for continued religious expression so that Islam did not become the “rallying point against European rule” (2017, p.43) that was so feared. The message conveyed was that “France was friendly to Islam and that Islam was compatible with French values” (2017, p.45) — provided it did not threaten French power.
The modern relationship between Islam and laïcité in France, must, therefore, be understood in the context of both France’s colonization of North Africa and laïcité as a tool seen to strengthen the French Republic.
Islam and laïcité in France today
Since the start of the 20th century, the number of Muslims in France has continued to grow, with Tolan estimating that Muslims comprise between 3–10% of the French population. The variability in these statistics stems from the broad definition of a “French Muslim,” which is itself complicated by several factors: there is no specific “baseline” that one must meet to be considered Muslim; the notion of being “culturally Muslim” persists; and little attention was given to the religious identity of immigrants and their descendants until the late 1980s. As a result it is impossible to accurately determine how many Muslims immigrated to France before that point.
To accommodate the increasing number of Muslims in France, new institutions such as mosques, hospitals, and social service programs were established. They were intended not only to “cater to the needs of Muslim living in metropolitan France” (2017, p.45) but also to monitor and control “a growing, largely working class, immigrant community” (2017, p.45). Although these efforts aimed to integrate the growing Muslim population, “many of these policies effectively segregated Muslims from other French nationals and non-Muslim immigrants” (Tolan, 2017, p.45) creating a division between “Muslim” institutions and “Other” institutions. This segregation, which forced social and economic injustices, echoes “the humiliations and injustices of the colonial past” (Tolan, 2017, p.46) and has since heightened perceptions of state discrimination against French Muslims nowadays.
These social and economic inequalities, as well as “the deep historical distrust of public manifestation of religion” (Tolan, 2017, p.45), thus provide a broader current context for the tensions between laïcité and Islam today.
The most prominent manifestation of these tensions is seen through the ongoing debate over the headscarf and its place in France since the 1980s. The headscarf first became a major point of contention when three Muslim students were “suspended for refusing to remove their scarves at a Lycée near Paris” (Tolan, 2017, p.47). At the time, the Council of State “ruled that the scarf’s quasi-religious expression was compatible with laïcité” (2017, p.47), as the law protected individuals’ rights to express their religions, so long as it did not threaten public order.
However, in recent years, secular laws have been introduced in order to “protect” the public sphere to a greater extent, though they have often been seen as particularly impacting Muslims. The 2004 law banning religious symbols in state schools exemplifies this, criticized as it was for being “clearly inspired by headscarf affairs and thus clearly targeted at Islam” (Hunter-Henin, 2012, p.637). The “forced burkini removal in Nice” (Jung, 2016, p.6), known as the “burkini ban”, is also viewed as another key example of disproportionate discrimination against Muslims in the name of protecting French secular values.
In response to the 2016 “burkini ban”, the State Council ruled that it “dealt a serious and clearly illegal blow to fundamental liberties such as the freedom of movement, freedom of conscience and personal liberty” (2017, p.44), highlighting the ongoing conflict within France over the true meaning of laïcité. Tolan argues that the ambiguity of the policy, along with its subsequent manipulation by politicians — such as those of the right-wing in France, who believe that these laws protect French society from a “massive Islamization” (2017, p.46) — contribute to the ever-growing debate about laïcité and its relationship with Islam.
When evaluating the tensions between laïcité and Islam, Tolan suggests it is essential to understand the full scope of the historical and current context, as an oversimplification “only serves the interest of radical elements in society”. Factors such as the context in which laïcité was conceived, the “deep historical distrust of public manifestation of religion” in France, the colonial dynamic between Islam and French secularism, and the ambiguity of laïcité itself must all be considered to address the ongoing tensions.
References
Hunter-Henin, M. (2012). Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious Freedom. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 61(3), 613–639.
Jung, C. (2016). Criminalization of the Burkin. Harvard International Review, 38(1), 6–7.
Murray-Miller, G. (2014). A Conflicted Sense of Nationality: Napoleon III’s Arab Kingdom and the Paradoxes of French Multiculturalism. French Colonial History, 15, 1–38.
Tolan, J. (2017). A French Paradox? Islam and Laïcité. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 41–50.
Eleanor Duke, is currently a third-year student in French and Arabic student at the University of Manchester and abroad studying Modern Standard Arabic at the Arabic Language Institute in Fes (Morocco).